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Entanglement plays a crucial role in the security of quantum key distribution. A secret key can only
be obtained by two parties if there exists a corresponding entanglement-based description of the pro-
tocol in which entanglement is witnessed, as shown by Curty et al (2004) [1]. Here we investigate the
role of entanglement for the generalization of quantum key distribution to the multipartite scenario,
namely conference key agreement. In particular, we ask whether the strongest form of multipar-
tite entanglement, namely genuine multipartite entanglement, is necessary to establish a conference
key. We show that, surprisingly, a non-zero conference key can be obtained even if the parties share
biseparable states in each round of the protocol. Moreover we relate conference key agreement with
entanglement witnesses and show that a non-zero conference key can be interpreted as a non-linear
entanglement witness that detects a class of states which cannot be detected by usual linear entangle-
ment witnesses.
Introduction – Secure communication is a central de-
mand for modern society. Security can be provided by
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) which readily enters
the industrial market. In QKD [2, 3] entanglement plays
a crucial role in the security proofs [4, 5]. Indeed, even
prepare-and-measure protocols [2, 6], which do not re-
quire any entanglement for their implementation, have
an entanglement-based counterpart [7] which can be
used for the protocol’s security analysis. In Ref. [1], the
authors showed that entanglement is in fact a necessary
condition to obtain a secure key in a QKD protocol and,
moreover, the entanglement of the state shared by Al-
ice and Bob can be witnessed using the measurements
performed in the protocol.
We consider a generalization of QKD to the scenario
where N parties wish to establish a common shared se-
cret key. This task is called conference key agreement
(CKA) and allows for secure broadcast. CKA can be
achieved using a concatenation of bipartite QKD [8–
10], together with additional classical communication.
However, the rich structure of multipartite correlations
opens the possibility to design new protocols. Sev-
eral protocols exploiting the correlations of multipar-
tite entangled states have been proposed using qubit
systems in the device-dependent [11–15] and device-
independent scenario [16–18], as well as continuous-
variables systems [19–21]. Even a proof of principle im-
plementation of CKA with four nodes has been recently
realized [22].
Here we ask the question of whether the strongest
form of multipartite entanglement, namely genuine
multipartite entanglement, is a necessary ingredient for
CKA based on multipartite quantum correlations. We
will show that, counter-intuitively, this is not the case: N
parties can establish a secret conference key even when
the state distributed in each round of the protocol is
∗ carrara@uni-duesseldorf.de
† glaucia.murta@uni-duesseldorf.de
biseparable. Moreover, we prove that, in order to ob-
tain a non-zero conference key, the measurements used
in the protocol need to be able to witness entanglement
across any partition of the set of parties, extending the
result of Ref. [1] to the multipartite scenario.
Preliminaries – We focus on CKA protocols [23] consist-
ing of several rounds where, in each round, a single
copy of a multipartite state is distributed to the N par-
ties, namely Alice and Bob1, . . . , BobN−1. Upon receiv-
ing the systems, the parties perform local measurements
and record the classical outcome.
In such protocols, an important figure of merit is
the asymptotic secret key rate, i.e. the ratio between
the number of extracted secret bits and the number of
shared copies of the state, in the limit of an infinite num-
ber of rounds. Analogously to the bipartite case [24, 25],
the asymptotic secret key rate of the CKA protocols un-
der consideration can be expressed, after the usual post-
processing (parameter estimation, one-way information
reconciliation and privacy amplification) as [13]
r∞ = max
[
0, H(X|E)−max
i
H(X|Yi)
]
, (1)
where X and Yi denote the registers that store the out-
comes of the measurements performed by Alice and
Bobi, respectively, in the key generation rounds. Here
H(X|E) = H(XE)−H(E) is the von Neumann entropy
of Alice’s outcome in the key generation rounds, con-
ditioned on Eve’s (possibly quantum) side information.
H(X|Yi) = H(XYi) − H(Yi) represents the amount of
information Alice needs to communicate to Bobi so that
he can correct his raw key. The maximum over the Bobs
in Eq. (1) illustrates the fact that Alice needs to com-
municate enough information to correct for the worst
case of the Bobs. We recall that for a state ρX of a sys-
tem X , the quantum von Neumann entropy is defined
as H(X) = −Tr[ρX log ρX ].
The conditional von Neumann entropy satisfy the fol-
lowing properties [26]:
1. Additivity for product states [26, Corollary 5.9]: if
ρAB = ρA ⊗ ρB then H(A|B) = H(A).
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22. Data-processing [26, Corollary 5.5]: considering
ρABC then H(A|BC) ≤ H(A|B).
3. Conditioning on classical information [26, Propo-
sition 5.4]: if ρABF =
∑
j qjρ
j
AB ⊗ |j〉〈j|F
is a classical-quantum state where the system
F is a classical register, then H(A|BF ) =∑
j qjH(A|BF = j) where H(A|BF = j) is evalu-
ated on the state ρjAB .
Our goal is to investigate the role of multipartite en-
tanglement in the single copy of the state shared by the
N parties in each round of the protocol. In the bipartite
case either the state is separable and no key can be ex-
tracted, or the state is entangled and can potentially be
used for QKD [1]. In the multipartite scenario, however,
different classes of entanglement can be defined, which
have been extensively studied [27–31].
Let Sα be a proper subset of the parties and S¯α be the
complement. Then a state ρAB1...BN−1 is separable with
respect to the partition Sα|S¯α if it is of the form
ρAB1...BN−1 =
∑
j
qjρ
j
Sα
⊗ ρj
S¯α
, (2)
where ρjSα and ρ
j
S¯α
are states shared by the parties in Sα
and S¯α, respectively, and where qj ≥ 0 and
∑
j qj = 1.
A state is called biseparable [27], if it is a convex com-
bination of states that are separable with respect to dif-
ferent partitions, that is
ρbs =
∑
Sα
∑
j
qjSαρ
j
Sα
⊗ ρj
S¯α
, (3)
where the first sum is performed over all proper subsets
Sα of the parties. Again, the coefficients must satisfy
qjSα ≥ 0 ∀j, Sα and
∑
α
∑
j q
j
Sα
= 1. It is worth noting
that a state can be biseparable, yet not separable with
respect to any partition.
Finally, if a state cannot be written in the form of Eq.
(3) we call it genuine multipartite entangled (GME). All
CKA protocols based on multipartite entanglement pro-
posed so far [11–17, 19–21], explore the correlations of
GME states, such as the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger
(GHZ) state [32] or the W state [33].
Entanglement is necessary for CKA – In the following we
prove that entanglement across all partitions in the state
shared by the parties is necessary in order to lead to a
non-zero asymptotic conference key rate.
Theorem 1. Given a CKA protocol, if the state shared by the
N parties is separable with respect to some partition Sα|S¯α,
then r∞ = 0.
Proof of Theorem 1. To prove the statement, since the
asymptotic key rate in Eq. (1) includes an optimization
over all the Bobs, it suffices to prove that H(X|Yl) ≥
H(X|E) for a specific Bobl. Let us consider a state sepa-
rable with respect to a partition Sα|S¯α, in the form of Eq.
(2), such that Sα contains Alice. We consider a Bob con-
tained in S¯α, let us say Bobl. Let Eve have a purification
of the state of the form
|ψAB1,...,BN−1EFF ′〉 =
∑
j
√
qj |ψjSαS¯αE〉|j〉F |j〉F ′ , (4)
where |ψj
SαS¯αE
〉 is a purification of ρjSα⊗ρ
j
S¯α
and the sys-
tems F and F ′ are classical registers held by Eve. The
additional classical register F ′ is necessary to exploit
the properties of the von Neumann entropy of classical-
quantum states. In fact, tracing out the system F ′, Eve’s
system E and all the Bobs except Bl will result in a state
of the form
ρABlF =
∑
j
qjρ
j
A ⊗ ρjBl ⊗ |j〉〈j|F (5)
which is a classical-quantum state consisting of a sepa-
rable state for Alice and Bob Bl, paired with the classi-
cal register F held by Eve. We remark that performing
local measurements on a separable state will result in
a separable state. Thus, after the measurements of the
CKA protocol the state will still be in the form of Eq. (5).
Moreover, we can write the following chain of inequali-
ties:
H(X|Yl) ≥ H(X|YlF )
=
∑
j
qjH(X|YlF = j)
=
∑
j
qjH(X|F = j)
= H(X|F ) ≥ H(X|EFF ′) = H(X|Etot)
(6)
where Etot indicates the global subsystem of Eve, which
includes the classical registers. In the first, second and
third line we used Property 2, Property 3 and Property
1 of the conditional Von Neumann entropy, respectively.
Finally, in the fourth line we used again Properties 2 and
3. This concludes the proof.
It follows that there must be some entanglement
shared between Alice and all the Bobs in order to es-
tablish a secret common key. It is worth noting that for
N = 2 this proof simplifies the argumentation given in
Ref. [1].
CKA without GME – We will now focus on the main
question, that is whether a positive conference key can
be established without GME. We answer this question
in the affirmative by exhibiting a family of biseparable
states that can lead to non-zero conference key:
ρ
(N,k)
AB1,...,BN−1 =∑
α
Sα∈S(k)
1
N Φ
GHZ,k
Sα
⊗
m
Bm∈S¯α
|+〉〈+|Bm , (7)
where S(k) is the set of subsets of k parties that contain
Alice and k − 1 Bobs, ΦGHZ,kSα = |GHZ〉〈GHZ|Sα is the
3projector of the GHZ state shared by the k parties of the
subset Sα, defined as |GHZ〉Sα = 1√2
(|0〉⊗k + |1〉⊗k)
and |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). The normalization factor is
equal to N = (N−1k−1) since the number of terms in the
convex combination is equal to the number of subsets of
cardinality k − 1 within the N − 1 Bobs.
If the parties perform measurements in the Z basis for
key generation, we can show that this class of states al-
ways leads to H(X|E) = 1. The reason is that the re-
duced density matrix, describing Alice and Eve’s state
after the measurement, has the form ρXE = 1X2 ⊗ ρE ,
where ρE is Eve’s reduced state. Thus, using Property 1
of the conditional entropy we have H(X|E) = H(X) =
1. The detailed proof can be found in the Supplemental
Material.
We calculate the asymptotic conference key rate for
the family of states ρ(N,k)AB1,...,BN−1 , Eq. (7), as a function of
the total number of parties N and the number of parties
that are entangled k (for details, see the Supplemental
Material):
r∞(N, k) =
1
2
N − k
N − 1 log2
(
N − k
N − 1
)
+
+
1
2
N + k − 2
N − 1 log2
(
N + k − 2
N − 1
)
. (8)
We remark that we have assumed a full characterization
of the state, which can be achieved, e.g., if the parties
perform measurements in all the Pauli bases during the
test rounds of the CKA protocol. In Figure 1 we show
the secret key rate as a function of the number of parties
N for different values of the number of entangled par-
ties k. We conclude that it is indeed possible to obtain a
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Figure 1. Asymptotic secret key rate for the state of Eq. (7) as
a function of N for different values of k. We remark that since
k ≤ N − 1, the curves start at different values of N .
non-zero asymptotic secret key rate from a biseparable
state.
Figure 1 shows that r∞ asymptotically (i.e. for N →
∞) approaches 1 if k equalsN−1. Moreover, even in the
case when only 2 parties, Alice and one of the Bobs, are
entangled in each term of the mixture, a non-zero secret
key can be obtained. However, for a fixed value of k,
r∞ → 0 as N increases.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the asymptotic key
rate for the family of states ρ(N,k)AB1,...,BN−1 , Eq. (7), for dif-
ferent functions k(N). The plots show that if k is a linear
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Figure 2. Asymptotic secret key rate for the state of Eq. (7) as
a function of N , with k depending differently on N .
function of N , the asymptotic key rate reaches a finite
value, whereas for k =
√
N the key rate drops asymp-
totically to zero as N increases.
We have also analyzed the previously introduced pro-
tocols that generalize the six-state [13] and the BB84 [14]
protocols to the multipartite scenario. Using the crite-
rion introduced in Ref. [34], we can exhibit a family of
biseparable states that yield a non-zero key rate in these
simple protocols. The full analysis can be found in the
Supplemental Material.
Our results show that CKA without GME states is
possible. We remark that in Ref. [35] the authors have
established that GME is a necessary condition for non-
zero key in a one-shot conference key agreement pro-
tocol. This result, at first, seems in contradiction to
our findings, however Ref. [35] refers to the global input
state, that for the class of protocols we consider would
be ρ⊗nAB1...BN−1 , where n is the number of rounds. Since
the set of biseparable states is not closed under tensor
product, the global input state can be GME even if the
single copy of the state is biseparable. Here we focus
on analysing the entanglement properties of the single
copy of the states. This is because we consider a class
of protocols in which the states are distributed and mea-
sured at each round, therefore no storage or quantum
global operation on all the copies is required.
CKA and entanglement witnesses – Theorem 1 provides us
with a necessary condition to obtain a non-zero key rate
in a CKA protocol. We now want to extend to the mul-
tipartite scenario the bipartite result presented in Ref.
[1]: no secret key can be extracted in a QKD protocol
unless Alice and Bob are able to witness entanglement
in the shared state using the measurements performed
in the protocol. An entanglement witness [31, 36, 37] is
a Hermitian operator W such that Tr(Wσ) ≥ 0 for all
4separable states σ and Tr(Wρ) < 0 for at least one en-
tangled state ρ. This definition of an entanglement wit-
ness is based on the fact that the set of separable states
is closed and convex, and can thus be separated with a
hyperplane from its complement [36, 38]. In the mul-
tipartite scenario, given the more intricate structure of
possible correlations, witnesses can be defined to distin-
guish different classes of states [31]. We thus consider
the same approach of Ref. [1, Theorem 1]: starting from
the measurements performed by the parties, we analyze
the entanglement witnesses that can be constructed with
them. We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Given a CKA protocol in which the par-
ties use a set of local measurements, for the test and key
generation rounds, which are represented by the POVMs
{Gax}, {Gb1y1}, . . . , {G
bN−1
yN−1}, where a, b1, . . . bN−1 indicate
the outputs of the measurements labeled by x, y1, . . . , yN−1,
then one can obtain a non-zero asymptotic conference key rate
r∞ > 0 only if the presence of entanglement can be proved
across any partition of the parties into two subsets.
Moreover, the presence of entanglement across each bi-
partition can be verified through a set of entanglement wit-
nesses of the form
Wα =
∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
Gax⊗Gb1y1⊗· · ·⊗GbN−1yN−1 (9)
where α labels the partition Sα|S¯α with Sα being a proper
subset of the parties and S¯α is its complement, and where
c
(α)
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
are real coefficients.
The proof is given in the Supplemental Material. The-
orem 2 implies that entanglement across any bi-partition
can be witnessed using the statistics of results of the
measurements specified by the protocol, since the wit-
ness operators Wα are constructed from the POVM el-
ements of these measurements. Theorem 2, combined
with the results of the previous Section, leads to the fol-
lowing Corollary.
Corollary 2.1. The figure of merit r∞ > 0 is a non-linear
entanglement witness, detecting the presence of entanglement
across any bi-partition of the parties.
This corollary is due to the result of Theorem 2 in com-
bination with the examples presented in the previous
Section: In fact, the union of all the sets of states that
are separable with respect to a specific partition is not a
convex set and thus cannot be separated by linear wit-
nesses from its complement [36] (see Figure 3). More-
over, if a CKA protocol is performed and a non-zero key
rate is obtained, it is a necessary condition that the state
shared by the parties is not separable across any parti-
tion of the parties. Therefore, a non-zero key rate reveals
that the state utilized in the protocol is outside of the
union of the sets of states that are separable with respect
to a fixed partition. Finally, the results of the previous
Section tell us that non-GME states can also lead to a
non-zero conference key, thus allowing us to conclude
that the witness cannot be linear, hence the corollary.
A|BC B|AC
C|AB
GME
Linear witness
   Fully 
separable
Figure 3. (Color online) Schematic representation of the set of
tripartite states, adapted from Ref. [39]. In blue is represented
the set of GME states. In red is highlighted the set of bisep-
arable states that are not separable with respect to any fixed
partition, whereas in yellow are represented the sets of states
that are separable with respect to a fixed partition. In green
is represented the set of fully separable states. A linear wit-
ness defines a hyperplane in the space of states. A non-zero
conference key rate can be seen as a non-linear entanglement
witness, as it can detect states in the red area, i.e. outside a
non-convex set.
Conclusions – We addressed the question of whether
GME is a necessary resource for a conference key agree-
ment protocol. We proved that, surprisingly, the parties
can establish a conference key by sharing biseparable
states in each round of the protocol. To show this, we
exhibited a family of suitable biseparable states. More-
over, we proved that no conference key can be extracted
if the state is separable with respect to any partition of
the parties. We remark that our results can have di-
rect implications to experimental implementations, as
we have shown an explicit way to obtain a conference
key using biseparable states, which are much less costly
to produce. Further investigation is required to deter-
mine the noise tolerance of implementations that aim to
produce these states.
Finally, we related our results to the concept of entan-
glement witness, showing that a non-zero asymptotic
conference key rate can only be obtained if one is able
to detect entanglement, across any partition, in the state
shared by the parties in each round of the CKA protocol.
This extends the result of Ref. [1] for bipartite QKD to
the multipartite scenario. As a consequence, we can in-
fer that a non-zero asymptotic conference key rate repre-
sents a non-linear entanglement witness, which can de-
tect a type of entanglement that cannot be detected by
the traditional linear entanglement witnesses.
Given our results, several lines of research can follow.
For example, it is known that distillation of GHZ states
starting from biseparable states is possible [31]. More-
5over, the GHZ state can be used to generate a perfect
conference key. It is an open question whether the con-
sidered class of CKA protocols is equivalent to the dis-
tillation of a GHZ state from biseparable states. Such
a result can lead to converse bounds on the key rates
achievable by different classes of multipartite entangled
states in the considered CKA protocols.
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1Supplemental Material: Genuine multipartite entanglement is not a precondition for secure
conference key agreement
I. CONDITIONAL ENTROPYH(X|E) FOR THE FAMILY OF STATES ρ(N,k)AB1,...,BN−1
Here we will calculate the conditional entropy H(X|E) for a generalization of the family of states ρ(N,k)AB1,...,BN−1 , as
we consider states of the form
ρAB1,...,BN−1 =∑
α
Sα∈S(k)
qαΦ
GHZ,k
Sα
⊗
m
Bm∈S¯α
|+〉〈+|Bm (S1)
where ΦGHZ,kSα = |GHZ〉〈GHZ|Sα , is the projector of the GHZ state shared by the parties of the subset Sα, defined
as |GHZ〉Sα = 1√2
(|0〉⊗k + |1〉⊗k) and |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉). We substituted 1N with some general real coefficients qα
such that qα ≥ 0 ∀α and
∑
α qα = 1.
We start the explicit calculation of the conditional entropyH(X|E) by writing a purification of the state in Eq. (S1).
An explicit valid purification of the state is given by
|ψAB1,...,BN−1E〉 =
∑
α
Sα∈S(k)
√
qα|GHZ〉Sα
⊗
m
Bm∈S¯α
|+〉Bm |eα〉 (S2)
where {|eα〉}α is an orthonormal basis of Eve’s subsystem of proper dimension. We thus look at the state after Alice
performs her measurements on the Pauli Z basis. We obtain the following explicit expression of the state
ρXB1,...,BN−1E =∑
α,β
Sα ,Sβ∈S(k)
1
2
√
qαqβ
|0〉X〈0| ⊗
Bm∈Iα,β
|0〉Bm〈0|
⊗
Br∈U¯α,β
|+〉Br 〈+|
⊗
Bt∈Sα\Iα,β
|0〉Bt〈+|
⊗
Bl∈Sβ\Iα,β
|+〉Bl〈0| ⊗ |eα〉〈eβ |
+|1〉X〈1|
⊗
Bm∈Iα,β
|1〉Bm〈1|
⊗
Br∈U¯α,β
|+〉Br 〈+|
⊗
Bt∈Sα\Iα,β
|1〉Bt〈+|
⊗
Bl∈Sβ\Iα,β
|+〉Bl〈1| ⊗ |eα〉〈eβ |

(S3)
where Iα,β = (Sα ∩ Sβ) is the intersection and Uα,β = Sα ∪ Sβ the union between the subsets of the Bobs in Sα and
Sβ , U¯α,β is the complement of Uα,β and ρXB1,...,BN−1E indicates the state after Alice’s measurement. We can then
trace out all the Bobs, which leaves us with Alice and Eve’s reduced state in the form
ρXE =
∑
α,β
1
2
√
qαqβ
2k−sα,β
|0〉X〈0| ⊗ |eα〉〈eβ |+
∑
α,β
1
2
√
qαqβ
2k−sα,β
|1〉X〈1| ⊗ |eα〉〈eβ | =
=
∑
α,β
Eα,β
1
2
(|0〉X〈0|+ |1〉X〈1|)| ⊗ |eα〉〈eβ | = 1X
2
⊗ ρE (S4)
where sα,β is the cardinality of Iα,β , where we defined Eα,β =
√
qαqβ
2k−sα,β
in the second line of the equation and where
ρE =
∑
α,β Eα,β |eα〉〈eβ | is Eve’s reduced state. Finally, since ρXE is a product state, we can use Property 1 of the
conditional entropy to write H(X|E) = H(X) = 1, thus concluding the proof.
II. CONFERENCE KEY RATES FOR THE FAMILY OF STATES ρ(N,k)AB1,...,BN−1
We now evaluate the analytical expression for the asymptotic key rate for the family of biseparable states
ρ
(N,k)
AB1,...,BN−1 , given by Eq. (7) in the main text. We recall that the number of terms in the convex combination is
2equal to the number of subsets of cardinality k− 1 within the N − 1 Bobs, which is equal toN = (N−1k−1), and that we
consider all the coefficients to be equal to qα = 1N .
To calculate the asymptotic key rate, since H(X|E) = 1, as proven in Section I, we need to evaluate the leakage
H(X|Yi) ∀ Bobi which, with our choice of coefficients, will be equal for all the Bobs. We thus calculate the reduced
density matrix of Alice and Bobi after they perform the key generation measurements, ρXYi , in order to estimate the
leakage term. Tracing out all the Bobs except one and performing the measurement both on Bobi and Alice’s side
gives us the state
ρXYi =
1
2
f
N (|0〉X〈0| ⊗ |0〉Yi〈0|+ |1〉X〈1| ⊗ |1〉Yi〈1|) + (1−
f
N )
1XYi
4
, (S5)
where f is the number of terms in which Bobi is entangled with Alice in the original state. The number f can be
expressed in term of k andN as f =
(
N−2
k−2
)
. Thus the reduced density matrix in the computational basis has the form
ρXYi =

1
4 (1 + CN,k) 0 0 0
0 14 (1− CN,k) 0 0
0 0 14 (1− CN,k) 0
0 0 0 14 (1 + CN,k)
 , (S6)
where CN,k = fN =
k−1
N−1 . Note that the reduced density matrix of Bobi after the measurement is ρYi =
1Yi
2 . We
therefore obtain
r∞(N, k) = 1−H(XYi) +H(Yi)
=
1
2
N − k
N − 1 log2
(
N − k
N − 1
)
+
1
2
N + k − 2
N − 1 log2
(
N + k − 2
N − 1
)
. (S7)
III. KNOWN CKA PROTOCOLS: MULTIPARTY BB84 [14] AND SIX-STATE [13]
We now consider two well known CKA protocols, namely the generalizations to the multipartite scenario of the
BB84 [14] and the six-state [13] protocols. Our aim is to show that, even for these protocols, a secure conference key
can also be established using biseparable states.
For that we consider the following N -partite state 34 |ψ+(N)0 〉〈ψ+(N)0 | + 14 |ψ−(N)0 〉〈ψ−(N)0 |, where |ψ±(N)0 〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉⊗N ± |1〉⊗N ), undergoing a depolarizing noise:
ρ
(N)
dep (p) = (1− p)
(
3
4
|ψ+(N)0 〉〈ψ+(N)0 |+
1
4
|ψ−(N)0 〉〈ψ−(N)0 |
)
+
p
2N
1N , (S8)
where p ∈ [0, 1].
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Figure S1. Plot of the asymptotic key rate for the state of Eq. (S8) as a function of p, for different values of N . In solid lines are
represented the results for the multipartite 6-state protocol, whereas in dashed lines are represented the results for the multipartite
BB84 protocol.
3A criterion introduced in Ref. [34] provides a necessary and sufficient condition for biseparability of states diago-
nal in the GHZ basis. Using this criterion, we can establish that the state ρ(N)dep (p), given in Eq. (S8), is biseparable for
all N and the whole range of p.
In Figure S1 we plot the asymptotic conference key rates achieved by the state ρ(N)dep (p) in the multiparty BB84 [14]
and six-state [13] protocols for N = 3 and N = 10.
The plots show that for both simple protocols a non-zero key rate is achievable with the biseparable state ρ(N)dep (p)
for some range of p. The asymptotic key rate, however, rapidly drops to zero as the white noise fraction increases.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
We give here the full proof of Theorem 2. For completeness we repeat the statement of the theorem.
Theorem 2. Given a CKA protocol in which the parties use a set of local measurements, for the test and key generation
rounds, which are represented by the POVMs {Gax}, {Gb1y1}, . . . , {G
bN−1
yN−1}, where a, b1, . . . bN−1 indicate the outputs of the
measurements labelled by x, y1, . . . , yN−1, then one can obtain a non-zero asymptotic conference key rate r∞ > 0 only if the
presence of entanglement can be proved across any partition of the parties.
Moreover, the presence of entanglement across each partition can be verified through a set of entanglement witnesses of the
form
Wα =
∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
Gax ⊗Gb1y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗GbN−1yN−1 (S9)
where α labels the partition Sα|S¯α with Sα being a proper subset of the parties and S¯α is its complement, and where c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
are real coefficients.
Proof. We start by focusing on the probability distribution of the outcomes a, b1, . . . , bN−1 given the inputs
x, y1, . . . , yN−1 of the measurements that can be performed in the test and key generation rounds of the CKA proto-
col, namely P (a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1). The probability distributions are obtained as
P (a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) = Tr(Gax ⊗Gb1y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗GbN−1yN−1ρAB1...BN−1), (S10)
where Gax, Gbiyi are the POVM elements of the measurements performed by Alice and Bobi, respectively.
We analyze the map that maps each state into the corresponding probability distribution, given the measurements
of the protocol, that is
ΠCKA : ρAB1...BN−1 7→ {P (a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1)} (S11)
Considering a subset of the Hilbert space, namely Σ, we call ΣΠ the projection of the subset Σ through the map
ΠCKA, defined as in Eq. (S10). We now denote the set of states separable across the partition Sα|S¯α as Σα. We
note that Σα is a closed and convex set. Furthermore, the projection of the set Σα through the linear map ΠCKA,
namely ΣΠα is still a closed and convex set. The elements of the projected set represent the probability distributions
that come from states that are separable across the partition Sα|S¯α. Due to Theorem 1, a necessary condition to
obtain a non-zero key rate is that the state is not separable with respect to any partition. This implies that, given a
state ρ∗A,B1,...,BN−1 that leads to a non-zero key rate in a specific protocol, the corresponding probability distribution
P ∗(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) is such that P ∗(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) /∈ ΣΠα ∀α. Moreover, since each ΣΠα
is a convex and compact set, it is a well known fact that each element of its complement Σ¯Πα can be separated from
ΣΠα with a proper hyperplane [36, 38]. In the probability space any hyperplane can be defined as∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
cx,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
P (a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) = 0 (S12)
where cx,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
are real coefficients. Furthermore, for each probability distribution
P ∗(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) /∈ ΣΠα ∀α, we can find, for each partition Sα|S¯α, coefficients c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
,
4defining hyperplanes such that
∀Pα(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) ∈ΣΠα
∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
Pα(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) ≥ 0 and
for P ∗(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) /∈ΣΠα ∀α,
∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
P ∗(a, b1, . . . , bN−1|x, y1, . . . , yN−1) < 0
(S13)
Finally, the coefficients define a set of entanglement witnesses in the form
Wα =
∑
x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
c(α)x,y1,...,yN−1
a,b1,...,bN−1
Gax ⊗Gb1y1 ⊗ · · · ⊗GbN−1yN−1 (S14)
such that, due to Eq. (S13), for each α
Tr(Wασα) ≥ 0 , ∀σα ∈ Σα
Tr(Wαρ∗A,B1,...,BN−1) < 0. (S15)
As a matter of fact, Eq. (S15) tells us that the operator Wα is an entanglement witness [31, 36] that detect entangle-
ment across partition Sα|S¯α. This concludes the proof of the Theorem.
